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We would like to thank Rick Swedloff and Peter Huang for taking
the time to comment on our Essay, and it is a pleasure to engage in a
dialogue with them about hedonic adaptation. In every instance,
however, their critiques miss the mark. Swedloff and Huang have
mischaracterized many of our key arguments, and the remainder of the
significant points made in their responses were anticipated and answered
in our Essay.
Let us begin with a one-paragraph summary of our Essay to clarify
what we have claimed. Civil procedure scholars have spent decades
analyzing the circumstances under which lawsuits settle. We argue that
the settlement models created by those scholars have omitted a relevant
factor: plaintiffs’ psychological adaptation to their ailments. Because
people adapt to certain injuries—i.e., their happiness or subjective wellbeing increases with time, even if the injury is permanent—the sum they
will accept in settlement should decrease as time passes, all else being
equal. That is the sum and substance of our claim.
It is worth taking a moment to note what we do not claim. First, we
of course do not claim that adaptation is the only thing that affects
settlement or even that people with adaptable injuries will settle earlier
than those without them. Indeed, our Essay’s contribution is to identify
one new factor that should be added to the sophisticated, multi-factor
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analysis of settlement behavior that exists within the literature. Other
factors can and do cut in the other direction, as we discuss at length in
the Essay. But all else being equal, adaptation will make the plaintiffs
who experience it more likely to settle than they would have been if they
had not adapted at all. Second, we need not and do not assert that
people adapt entirely to their injuries. Rather, we identify a class of
injuries that admit of adaptation, then point to substantial empirical
evidence that people adapt partly to those injuries—i.e., that their level
of happiness increases as time passes after the injury, even though it may
never rebound fully to its pre-injury level. Our claim is only that, other
things being equal, people will be less happy immediately after their
injury (and therefore less willing to settle, all else equal) than later, due
to adaptation. That people do not adapt fully to reach pre-injury levels
(a point we acknowledge repeatedly) does not undercut this central
claim.1 Third, we draw no normative conclusions whatsoever: Our Essay
describes a phenomenon and predicts behavior, nothing more.
These three claims that we do not make are precisely the three
claims to which Huang objects. The first paragraph of his response
outlines his three points as follows: “First, people care about more than
happiness” and their settlement decisions may accordingly be affected by
such other factors; “[s]econd, adaptation can be slow and remain
incomplete after many years”; and “[t]hird, fostering emotional
adaptation by lengthy tort litigation raises ethical and normative
questions.”2 We agree with all of those points. The third one goes
beyond the scope of our Essay, and the first two are points that we make
at length in the Essay.
None of this would be a problem if it were not for the fact that
Huang characterizes his arguments as criticisms of what we have written.
The second sentence of his response is: “This Response demonstrates
that [the Essay] is a facile application of hedonic adaptation with the
following three points”3—i.e., the three points that contradict nothing
we wrote.
Rick Swedloff makes the same three categories of substantive points
as Huang, although Swedloff’s rendering acknowledges in several
instances our anticipation of his objections. First, Swedloff notes that the
empirical evidence shows only that certain injuries admit of adaptation
and that people adapt only partly, not fully, to even those injuries.4
1. The logic of the Essay shows that any nonzero amount of adaptation should have
the claimed effect, with the effect increasing as adaptation increases. The evidence
supports the view that people adapt far more than an amount just above zero, but either
way, characterizing the amount as small, as Huang does, Peter H. Huang, Emotional
Adaptation and Lawsuit Settlements, 108 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 50, 53 (2008),
http://columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/108/50_Huang.pdf, does not
contradict our claim that it exists and is relevant to settlement.
2. Id. at 50.
3. Id.
4. Rick Swedloff, Accounting for Happiness in Civil Settlements, 108 Colum. L. Rev.
Sidebar
39,
40–44
(2008),
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Second, Swedloff discusses the factors other than adaptation that affect
the litigation process and may interact with adaptation during that
process.5 And third, Swedloff considers the normative implications of
adaptation in the settlement process.6 Once again, these points are all
consistent with our claims in the Essay.
The following sections address the points raised by Huang and
Swedloff in more detail.
I. HUANG’S RESPONSE
A. Factors Other than Adaptation Can Influence Settlement
Huang’s first criticism of our Essay is that factors other than
happiness go into the decision to settle a lawsuit.7 We acknowledged this
point in the Essay, with italics in the original: “We mean only to say that
all things being equal, delay will drive settlement through hedonic
adaptation.”8 In fact, we spent much of the Essay describing such other
factors.9 As we have made clear from the outset, there are many things
that a plaintiff might care about during litigation; one of those things is
her view of what constitutes fair and appropriate compensation, and that
view is likely to be affected, at least in some cases, by adaptation to her
injuries. That she might also care about other things, and that her
opinion about fairness might also involve other considerations, is not in
dispute.
For this reason, Huang is wrong to conclude that if some factor
caused faster litigation to promote settlement, then that fact would
contradict our conclusion. Our claim is not absolute but relative. We do
not argue that cases settle more if litigation moves slowly, but rather that
whatever combination of factors determines the likelihood of settlement,
adaptation is one factor in the mix that increases its likelihood. As we
emphasized in the Essay: “We wish to stress that we make no claims on
the ultimate frequency of settlement in protracted or expeditious cases
(or the relative rates of settlement in each case).”10
One of Huang’s main examples of a factor other than adaptation
that can influence settlement—i.e., acrimony—is a factor we discuss,
http://columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/108/39_Swedloff.pdf.
5. Id. at 44–46.
6. Id. at 46–48.
7. See Huang, supra note 1, at 51 (“Naturally, individuals desire happiness; but most
people, especially litigation parties, care about emotions other than happiness and care
about things other than emotions.”).
8. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Hedonic Adaptation
and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1516, 1543 (2008).
9. See, e.g., id. at 1519–26, 1536–48.
10. Id. at 1543. It is worth noting that when we say that we make no claim regarding
“the relative rates of settlement in each case” we are referring to the overall rate of
settlement in expeditious cases versus the rate of settlement in protracted cases. Id. Our
claim is precisely about the relative rates of settlement of adaptable versus nonadaptable
cases in expeditious cases, and the same relative rate in protracted cases.
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saying the same thing about it that he does. Huang writes that “tort
lawsuits can become unpleasant, with each side determined to
emotionally harass the other. Parties can end up in a vicious cycle of
aggressive litigation behavior: Litigation causes negative affect, leading
to more aggressive litigation behavior that causes further negative affect,
and so forth.”11 We similarly write that “delays and time lags in litigation
are often caused by hard bargaining and acrimony between the parties.
As much as the adaptation that follows from delay might increase the
rate of settlement, the rancor that accompanies it might act in the
opposite direction.”12
Huang goes too far, however, when he contends that “[t]ort victims
motivated by . . . emotions [such as ‘blameworthiness, efficiency, equity,
fairness, justice, morality, and responsibility’] will continue litigation
even if they experience complete hedonic adaptation,”13 and that “for
these other motivations, hedonic adaptation is generally irrelevant.”14
On the contrary, litigants motivated by “equity, fairness, justice, [and]
morality” may well adjust their opinions of the fair outcome of the
litigation as they discover that the injuries’ effects on their well-being are
not as durable as they had supposed. Part of our core argument, after
all, is that litigants consider “values like fairness when deciding whether
to accept a settlement offer”15 such that “[i]f a plaintiff’s perception of
what would constitute fair compensation were to decrease as time
passed, then that passage of time would accordingly increase the
likelihood of settlement.”16 We repeat here the caveat we offered in the
Essay:
To be sure, many factors could influence a plaintiff’s demand,
and her current experience of the injury is only one of them.
But holding constant all such other factors, one would expect a
plaintiff to be more willing to settle if, over time, she came to
view a smaller amount as representing a fair payment for her
injury.17
B. How Much Do People Adapt?
Huang’s argument about the nature of hedonic adaptation also
does not undercut our thesis. Some of his points simply report
psychological findings that we agree with and acknowledge repeatedly in
our Essay, e.g., “adaptation . . . will not be immediate,”18 and
11. Huang, supra note 1, at 51.
12. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1543.
13. Huang, supra note 1, at 51.
14. Id. at 52.
15. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1523.
16. Id. at 1526.
17. Id.
18. Huang, supra note 1, at 54. Compare, e.g., Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur,
supra note 8, at 1529 & n.71 (discussing two-year course of adaptation in Oswald and
Powdthavee study).
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“adaptation . . . can remain incomplete.”19 Other points he makes in this
section are both irrelevant to our claims and, we believe, mistaken. For
example, Huang argues that forecasting errors are normatively valuable
because if people foresaw their own adaptation, “they would neither do
anything desirable nor avoid doing anything undesirable because
nothing would have much impact on their long-run happiness.”20 We
take no position on any normative claim, but it is worth noting that
accurate forecasting would not necessarily detour people from pursuits
Huang considers desirable, for reasons Huang himself stresses: People
would care about the unhappiness they experience before adaptation,
and they might also value things other than their own happiness.
Huang’s only point that would, if true, undermine our Essay’s claim
is also the least sustainable part of his response. Without discussion,
Huang quotes a short commentary by Daniel Kahneman to suggest that
Kahneman has renounced the idea of hedonic adaptation.21 We
reproduce here Huang’s entire block quotation from Kahneman:
Ten years ago the generally accepted position was that there is
considerable hedonic adaptation to life conditions. . . .
Evidence that people adapt—though not completely—to
becoming paraplegic or winning the lottery supported the idea
of a “hedonic treadmill” . . . . [I]t is rare for a hypothesis to be
so thoroughly falsified. . . . [A]lthough I still find the idea of an
aspiration treadmill attractive, I had to give it up. . . . We have
been wrong and now we know it. I suppose this means that
there is a science of well-being, even if we are not doing it very
well.22
The ellipses would make it seem as though the “hypothesis”
that has been “so thoroughly falsified” is the notion that “there is
considerable hedonic adaptation to life conditions.” To the
contrary, Kahneman’s unaltered comments reveal that he said
nothing of the sort. Instead, the falsified hypothesis to which
19. Huang, supra note 1, at 53. Compare, e.g., Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur,
supra note 8, at 1529 & n.71 (explaining that Oswald and Powdthavee study shows partial
but “incomplete” adaptation).
20. Huang, supra note 1, at 55.
21. See id. at 53 (quoting Daniel Kahneman, The Sad Tale of the Aspiration
Treadmill,
Edge
World
Question
Center
(2008),
at
http://www.edge.org/q2008/q08_17.html#kahneman (on file with the Columbia Law
Review)). Though Huang does not discuss this passage, the fact that he locates it in a
section titled “Second Thoughts about Hedonic Adaptation,” id. at 52, is indicative of his
view. See also Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of
Happiness 28–30 (Mar. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354234 (quoting same excerpt for
proposition that “Daniel Kahneman recently publicly changed his views about hedonic
adaptation”).
22. Huang, supra note 1, at 53 (quoting Daniel Kahneman, The Sad Tale of the
Aspiration
Treadmill,
Edge
World
Question
Center
(2008),
at
http://www.edge.org/q2008/q08_17.html#kahneman (on file with the Columbia Law
Review)).
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Kahneman refers is his own theory of the aspiration treadmill,23
which was created to “offer[] an appealing solution to the puzzles of
adaptation.”24 Kahneman nowhere indicates that adaptation itself is
in doubt, and indeed in other work he makes clear the continuing
strength of the findings in favor of adaptation. For example, in the
research article that forms the basis for Kahneman’s public
comments that Huang quoted, Kahneman notes that while “initial
findings yield little support for the aspiration treadmill,”
“adaptation occurs even when well-being is measured with the gold
standard of the Experience Sampling Method.”25
C. Normative Issues
As for Huang’s section on normative considerations, he describes
accurately the intended scope of our piece in this statement: “If there is
hedonic adaptation because of litigation delay, at least five complex
ethical questions follow—none of which the Essay fully addresses.”26
Nonetheless, Huang expresses this point as a criticism: His use of the
word “fully” gives the impression that we touched upon these issues but
did not understand or address their full depth. Nothing could be
further from the truth. Every one of our claims is purely descriptive; we
treat these normative questions as beyond the scope of our argument
and orthogonal to the descriptive claims we make.27
23. Kahneman’s aspiration treadmill theory was designed to explain perceived
discrepancies between individuals’ moment-by-moment assessments of happiness and
their overall levels of satisfaction with their lives—discrepancies that Kahneman later
found did not exist, at least in the form that he originally believed. See generally Daniel
Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective WellBeing, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 2006, at 3. The important point is that the falsification of
the aspiration treadmill theory does not cast doubt on hedonic adaptation; if anything, it
reinforces it. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
24. Daniel Kahneman, The Sad Tale of the Aspiration Treadmill, Edge World
Question Center (2008), at http://www.edge.org/q2008/q08_17.html#kahneman (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
25. Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 23, at 16, 18; see also Alan B. Krueger, Daniel
Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, National Time
Accounting: The Currency of Life, in Measuring the Subjective Well-Being of Nations:
National Accounts of Time Use and Well-Being 9 (Alan B. Krueger ed., forthcoming),
available at http://www.nber.org/books/krue08-1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
We also note that the “AREA” model of adaptation does not contradict our
argument. Huang writes: “If this model is correct, the march of time is not why a tort
victim will adapt hedonically to an injury. Instead, this model suggests tort victims will
adapt emotionally to injuries after they explain and understand how and why they were
injured.” Huang, supra note 1, at 53–54. We never argued that the passage of time itself
was the causal factor behind adaptation, only that it was a necessary predicate to
adaptation. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1525 (“Due to such
adaptation, a plaintiff’s assessment of how severely she has been harmed will often change
over time.”); id. at 1534 (“Adaptation, as noted above, takes time . . . .”). Huang’s reasons
for adaptation would coincide with the passage of time, rendering all of our claims
unaffected.
26. Huang, supra note 1, at 55.
27. E.g., Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1518 (“[W]e propose that,
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II. SWEDLOFF’S RESPONSE
Swedloff’s points fit into the same categories as do Huang’s,
although they are organized slightly differently. We follow Swedloff’s
organization in addressing his arguments.
A. How Much People Adapt and How Adaptation Interacts with Other Factors
in Litigation
The main section of Swedloff’s response discusses our descriptive
claim.28 Swedloff makes five main points: (i) certain injuries may be
unadaptable;29 (ii) even for adaptable injuries, the adaptation is typically
incomplete;30 (iii) preferences rather than happiness level may drive
settlement negotiations;31 (iv) measurements of happiness may be
unreliable;32 and (v) elements of the litigation process might hinder
adaptation or limit its effects on settlement.33
We gave a full response to all of these points in the Essay, but we will
briefly restate our explanations here. Regarding the first point, Swedloff
himself points out that we acknowledged that adaptation does not occur
in all cases. In fact, it is central to our thesis that (as Swedloff puts it)
“some number of plaintiffs may not adapt to injury and, for those
plaintiffs, adaptation may be irrelevant to settlement.”34
As we
equivalently wrote, adaptation makes settlement more likely in lawsuits
arising from “the class of injuries that involve ongoing disabilities or
losses of function, but not continuous pain—in other words, those to
which humans are capable of adapting hedonically.”35
As to his second point, Swedloff notes—as do we—that the
longitudinal study by Oswald and Powdthavee finds about fifty percent
adaptation to moderate disability and thirty percent adaptation to severe
disability.36 We describe those results in the Essay as supplying
“substantial evidence that hedonic adaptation to disability is significant
(if incomplete).”37 Swedloff implies that this characterization goes too

by allowing plaintiffs time to adapt to their injuries, such delays may result in an increase
in settlements that avoid some of the costs of trial. Accordingly, we suggest that current
accountings of drawn out litigation processes have overstated the net costs attributable to
extended procedure.”); id. at 1539 (“[W]e mean only to argue that the current costbenefit accounting of the civil trial process is incorrect, and biased toward overestimation
of litigation costs.”).
28. Swedloff, supra note 4, at 40–46.
29. Id. at 40–41.
30. Id. at 41–42.
31. Id. at 42–43.
32. Id. at 43–44.
33. Id. at 44–46.
34. Id. at 41.
35. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1536; see also id. at 1530–31.
36. Compare Swedloff, supra note 4, at 42, with Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur,
supra note 8, at 1529.
37. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1529.
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far38 (or, as Huang puts it, “[w]hile reasonable people can quibble over
whether fifty percent adaptation is more like a glass being half full or
half empty, thirty percent adaptation is indisputably akin to a glass being
seventy percent empty”39). Of course, these issues of characterization
are entirely irrelevant to our claim that adaptation will affect settlement.
Whether one chooses to label the effect large or small, the only relevant
point is that the more people adapt, the greater the effect on settlement
will be. The study by Lucas that Swedloff cites would undercut our claim
only if it were interpreted to show zero adaptation,40 but as Swedloff
acknowledges, even Lucas found a reduction in psychological distress
over time. The lone subset of the lone study that arrives at contradictory
results, Lucas’s life-satisfaction numbers, does not refute the mountain
of evidence we survey supporting hedonic adaptation.41
Swedloff’s third point notes the study in which colostomy patients
reported placing a high value on living without a colostomy,
notwithstanding adaptation to colostomies.42 We address this point in
the Essay, saying the same thing about it that Swedloff does, namely that
it is “evidence for the limitations of subjective well-being as a measure of
welfare.”43 Swedloff does not address our point that even the results of
this same colostomy study suggest that a focusing illusion, rather than a
different way of valuing human life, is at work.44 In any event, as with the
Lucas study, isolated counterexamples do not invalidate the evidence for
adaptation. To deny our claim that adaptation exists and affects
settlement would be to disregard the weight of the evidence, to put the
point conservatively.
Swedloff’s fourth point is that measurements of happiness may be
subject to errors of self-reporting.45 There is no doubt that a particular
individual might unknowingly skew her self-report because she found a
dime just before taking the survey,46 but such noise should be washed
out by a survey’s large sample size.47 Moreover, even if self-reports were
38. See Swedloff, supra note 4, at 42.
39. Huang, supra note 1, at 53.
40. See Swedloff, supra note 4, at 41–42 (citing Richard E. Lucas, Long-Term
Disability Is Associated with Lasting Changes in Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from
Two Nationally Representative Studies, 92 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 717, 726 (2007)).
41. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1527–31. In addition, it is
worth noting that the studies by Oswald and Powdthavee and Lucas aggregate across all
disabilities, only distinguishing those that are moderate from those that are severe. As
other research on adaptation to disability suggests, however, adaptation is a complex
phenomenon that is likely to affect various disabilities in different ways. Thus, these
studies may fail to distinguish between adaptable and unadaptable injuries, a key aspect of
our theory.
42. Swedloff, supra note 4, at 42–43 (citing, inter alia, Dylan M. Smith et al.,
Misremembering Colostomies? Former Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings than Do
Current Patients, 25 Health Psychol. 688, 691 (2006)).
43. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1535 n.104.
44. Id.
45. Swedloff, supra note 4, at 43–44.
46. Id. at 43.
47. This would only introduce problems of systematic bias if we thought that many
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unreliable for measuring happiness on an absolute scale, they would still
provide the relative information necessary to measure adaptation. Our
Essay does not rely on the credibility of all subjective well-being research,
but only on two of its most robust findings: adaptation and affective
forecasting. Once again, the weight of the evidence supports our claims.
Finally, Swedloff suggests that elements of the litigation process
might hinder adaptation or limit its effects on settlement.48 We address
these points in our section on “Principal Objections,”49 which Swedloff
generally acknowledges. As we explain in that section, the effect of
adaptation of course decreases as the plaintiff’s lawyer’s control over
decisions about settlement increases,50 and the same is true regarding
issues of insurance.51 But as we go on to say, the idea that the lawyer
exerts full control “is a caricature of the attorney-client relationship;
more likely, each party will have some say over the most important
litigation choices, particularly the question of when and whether to
settle.”52 Swedloff notes in addition that adaptation is unimportant if
state damage caps limit pain and suffering awards to below the amount
that even an adapted plaintiff would view as fair or adequate. This is a
good point (and perhaps the only one we do not address in the Essay),
and we appreciate Swedloff’s having raised it. Just as with the role of
insurers, we expect that the vast majority of cases will be unaffected by
this limitation.
In sum, the Essay anticipated Swedloff’s objections and explained
why the idea we contribute is of value notwithstanding those caveats.
B. Normative Issues
Regarding Swedloff’s section on normative implications, we merely
reiterate that our Essay has nothing to say on that score. When Swedloff
says we argue “that immediately after the injury, the plaintiff incorrectly
predicts the duration of her pain and suffering and therefore demands
too high a settlement amount,” he attributes to us a normative claim we

people found dimes before filling out well-being surveys, a possibility we consider unlikely.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that people experience predominantly happy
sensations before taking surveys; a survey-taker seems equally likely to have just been
kicked in the shins. And the idea that happiness self-reports involve only random noise is
inconsistent with the fact that those reports generate such replicable and statistically
significant findings in so many areas. See Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein,
Hedonic Adaptation, in Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 302, 311–14
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) (reviewing research on hedonic adaptation).
48. Swedloff, supra note 4, at 44–46.
49. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1542–48.
50. Id. at 1542 (“Certainly if the plaintiff exerts no control over a lawsuit, her
adaptation is irrelevant.”).
51. Id. at 1542 n.132 (“Similarly, if the plaintiff has already recovered from her
insurer, and the insurance company is the true plaintiff at suit, the plaintiff’s adaptation
will not affect the lawsuit.” (citation omitted)).
52. Id. at 1542–43.
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do not make.53 We believe that people with adaptable injuries will tend
to settle earlier than they would have settled absent adaptation. We leave
others to decide whether this phenomenon is good or bad.

Preferred Citation: John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan
Masur, Describing the Effect of Adaptation on Settlement, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 21 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/
volume/109/21_Bronsteen.pdf.

53. Swedloff, supra note 4, at 47 (emphasis added). “Too high” is Swedloff’s phrase.
We wrote: “[T]he amount of money that the plaintiff believes will fairly compensate her
for her injury—the amount that will “make her whole” in the typical parlance of tort
damages—will decrease.” Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 8, at 1538. We
ascribed no normative judgment whatsoever to this phenomenon.

